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Many  papers  examine  general  level  preferences  for  redistribution.  However,  few 
papers examine preferences for specific forms of redistribution. This paper examines 
the decomposition of demand for three major categories of social welfare expenditure 
in  Ireland:  unemployment  payments,  old  age  pensions  and  child  benefit.  The 
determinants of preferences are found to be fairly consistent with a self-interested 
economics  perspective  with  respect  to  the  utilisation  and  financing  of  these  three 
specific schemes. In addition, the split sampling procedure used in the nationwide 
survey indicated that the provision of information on the schemes’ costs did not have 
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I - INTRODUCTION 
 
Several recent papers have examined preferences for government spending and for 
redistribution  (e.g.  Benabou  and  Ok  2001,  Corneo  and  Gruner  2002,  Fong  2001, 
Gemmell et al 2003, Hardiman, McCashin and Payne 2006, Kemp and Willetts 1995, 
Tarzwell 2003). However, the empirical papers to date examine very general attitudes 
to redistribution drawing from questions in international social surveys such as the 
World Values Survey. By examining preferences with respect to specific categories of 
redistribution,  there  is  an  opportunity  to  conduct  more  refined  tests  of  the 
determinants  of  preferences.  For  example,  preferences  of  different  demographic 
groups  can  be  examined  across  programmes  that  clearly  distinguish  between 
demographic groups in terms of utilisation. 
 
Delaney and O' Toole (2006) examined preferences from a nationwide survey for three 
major  types  of  government  expenditure  in  the  Republic  of  Ireland  (“Ireland”), 
namely,  health,  education  and  social  welfare.  However,  this  paper  examines 
preferences  for  three  specific  forms  of  social  welfare  expenditure:  unemployment 
payments, child benefit and old age pensions. In addition, this paper examines the 
results from the split-sampling procedure, under which the nationwide survey was 
conducted, whereby only one half of the respondents were given information about 
the cost of the three schemes. If respondents were processing only the desirability of 
schemes  (i.e.  "cost  neglect"),  it  is  likely  that  the  provision  of  macro-level  cost 
information  would  alter,  and  in  particular  decrease,  the  respondent’s  view  of  the 
appropriate micro-level of these payments. 
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II - SOCIAL TRANSFERS IN IRELAND: UTILIZATION AND FINANCING 
 
The history of the provision of income maintenance in Ireland has been traced in a 
number  of  different  works  which  generally  begin  with  an  examination  of  the 
codified system of family relations exemplified in the Brehon Laws, then examine 
the colonial activities of the British authorities and finally examine Ireland’s welfare 
experience  pre-,  and  post-,  WWII.
i  The  current  social  welfare  system,  which  is 
administered  by  the  Department  of  Social  and  Family  Affairs,  is  involved  in 
distributing  approximately  €13.6b  annually  (2006).
ii  The  social  welfare  system 
consists  of  three  main  types  of  transfers,  social  insurance  schemes  funded  by 
employer  and  employee  contributions,  which  distribute  approximately  €6.3b 
annually,  social  assistance  schemes  which  are  means-tested,  which  distribute 
approximately  €5b  annually,  and  universal  schemes  which  depend  on  claimant 
characteristics (e.g. the presence of children) but which are not means-tested, and 
which distribute approximately €2b annually. 
 
Child benefit is a transfer to households with children. The rate (€150 per month from 
May 2006) increases to some extent with the number of children and there are extra 
payments for multiple births and for childcare expenses (€1,000 annually) associated 
with children below the age of six. Child benefit payments represent the largest item 
of social welfare expenditure in Ireland, amounting to approximately €2 billion in 
2006. The Irish child benefit system is a universal system, i.e., it is not means-tested. 
Therefore,  significant  income  effects  with  respect  to  preferences  for  child  benefit 
payments would not be expected from a self-interested economics perspective.  
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However, given that women represent the main care-providers and furthermore that 
women  are  generally  the  direct  recipients  of  child  benefit  payments  in  Ireland,  a 
positive effect associated with being female on support for child benefit payments 
would be expected. 
 
State  old  age  pension  provision  in  Ireland  takes  the  form  of  a  small  number  of 
schemes financed either through the general exchequer and paid out as means-tested 
payments (e.g. old age non-contributory pension; approximately €730m in 2006), or 
financed through contributions to a social-insurance fund and administered by the 
Department  of  Social  and  Family  Affairs  (e.g.  old  age  contributory  pension; 
approximately €1.6b in 2006).
iii The highest contributory old age pension is €203.30 
per week (2006) and the highest non-contributory old age pension is €192.00 per 
week  (2006).  A  self-interested  economics  perspective  predicts  that  those  who 
perceive  that  they  will  financially  benefit  from  higher  rates  of  old  age  pension 
provision will be more supportive of higher levels. As such, those who are older and 
hence closer to receiving the payments and with less time left in the tax system, and 
those outside the tax system or on lower incomes, would be expected to demand 
higher levels of old age pension payments. 
 
Payments  to  the  unemployed  take  two  major  forms  in  Ireland.  Unemployment 
assistance payments (approximately €750m in 2006) are financed through the general 
exchequer  and  paid  out  as  means-tested  payments  while  unemployment  benefit 
payments  (approximately  €450m  in 2006) are  financed  through contributions  to  a 
social  insurance  fund  and  administered  by  the  Department  of  Social  and  Family 
Affairs.    GEARY WP/8/2006 
 
The highest (contributory and non-contributory) unemployment payment is €165.80 
per week (2006). Unemployment spending is consistently marked as a controversial 
issue  in  industrial  economies.  Unemployment  benefit  cheating  in  particular 
consistently creates tension and is a popular source of outrage stirring. Therefore, we 
include measures of punitive sentiment and perception of welfare cheating to control 
for  negative  attitudes  to  the  unemployed.  A  self-interested  economics  perspective 
predicts  that  risk  factors  associated  with  unemployment  would  be  positively 
associated  with  a  preference  for  high  unemployment  payments.  Conversely,  non-
exposure to this risk would predict preferences for lower payments. Thus, we would 
expect  higher  skills  as  proxied  by  higher  levels  of  education  and  income  to  be 
negatively correlated with preferences for increasing unemployment spending. 
 
From a financing perspective, it is noteworthy that the Irish tax system is relatively 
heavily  dependent  on  excise  and  expenditure  taxes,  neither  of  which  tend  to  be 
progressive in design or effect. In addition, employee  contributions to the social 
insurance fund are basically regressive by design. As such, it is reasonable to suggest 
that the financing of these three forms of social welfare expenditures is probably 
only mildly progressive in total and that a self-interested perspective should focus 





   GEARY WP/8/2006 
III - SURVEY 
 
As  outlined  in  Delaney  and  O’Toole  (2006),  Lansdowne  Market  Research 
administered the nationwide survey to a sample of 1,159 people employing quota 
controls to match the sample characteristics by sex, social class, region and age to the 
2002  Population  Census.  Pre-testing  took  the  form  of  an  online  survey  of  298 
respondents,  mainly  undergraduate  and  postgraduate  students.  Lansdowne  Market 
Research also conducted a number of pilot-tests on the scales used in the survey in 
order  to reduce  unnecessary  complexity  and  encourage  interview  completion. The 
administration took the form of face-to-face interviews during July 2004. The specific 
questions relevant to this paper are described below. 
 
In question 6 of the survey, respondents were given a table (“Showcard”) listing the 
15 most expensive social welfare schemes and asked to decide on a seven-point scale 
whether  they  thought  government  spending  in  each  of  these  areas  should  be 
decreased, left the same or increased. Only 50 per cent of the respondents were given 
information as to the macro level cost of each of these 15 schemes. However, all 
respondents were made aware of the implicit budget constraint through the wording of 
the question, “The Department of Social Welfare and Family Affairs spends money 
on various social welfare schemes. For each social welfare scheme I read out, please 
use this card to tell me whether you think that the scheme should be allocated more 
money or less money, either through changes in taxation or moving resources from 
one scheme to another.” 
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Respondents were next (question 7) asked to choose between pensions, child benefit, 
benefits  for  unemployed  people,  benefits  for  disabled  people,  benefits  for  single 
parents or none of these as to which was their highest priority for extra government 
spending on social benefits. Respondents were later asked to provide their views with 
respect to the appropriate level of the monthly child benefit payment (question 9), 
weekly unemployment payment (question 11) and weekly old age pension payment 
(question 13). 
 
Respondents were asked (question 3) to choose between more government spending 
and  taxation;  less  government  spending  and  taxation;  and,  an  unchanged  level  of 
government spending and taxation. Respondents were asked (question 15a) to choose 
between “A society with extensive social welfare but high taxes” or “A society where 
taxes  and  welfare  are  low  and  people  take  responsibility  for  themselves”  and 
(question 15b) “An egalitarian society where the gap between rich and poor is small 
regardless  of  achievement”  or  “A  competitive  society  where  wealth  is  distributed 
according to one’s achievement”. Respondents were also asked (question 16) for their 
level of agreement/disagreement with  the following statement:  “Large numbers of 
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IV - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
When asked their highest priority for extra social welfare spending, Table 1 indicates 
that 30.2 per cent of respondents chose pensions, 26.7 per cent chose benefits for the 
disabled, 14.4 per cent chose “none of these”, 11.7 per cent chose child benefit, 8 per 
cent chose benefits for unemployed people and 6 per cent chose benefits for single 
parents. 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
In terms of the three specific social welfare categories, the mean response for the 
appropriate  level  of  child  benefit  was  €147.47  per  child  per  month.  The  mean 
responses for the appropriate level of unemployment payment and old age pension 
payment were €163.62 per week and €203.08 per week, respectively. 
 
Table  2  displays  the  results  of  SUR  regressions  of  the  determinants  of  stated 
preferences for the appropriate level for these three social welfare benefit categories. 
Several models were estimated. The model displayed in Table 2 includes the standard 
demographic  variables,  but  also  includes  ideological  and  attitudinal  variables  as 
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Insert Table 2 about here  
 
The  contents  of  Table  2  appear  to  be  significantly  influenced  by  utilisation 
considerations. For example, the results demonstrate substantial income effects with 
those  on  higher  incomes  being  particularly  negatively  disposed  towards  higher 
unemployment payments. Those in full time employment were also more negatively 
disposed  towards  the  appropriate  level  for  unemployment  payment.  Those  with 
dependent  children  were  supportive  of  relatively  high  payments  for  all  three 
categories. Males were more supportive of higher unemployment payments, while 
perhaps surprisingly females did not differ from males with respect to the appropriate 
level of child benefit payment. In addition, neither age nor for the most part education 
appeared to influence respondents’ views. 
 
Unsurprisingly,  respondents  who  favoured  a  low  government  spending/taxation 
model  for  the  economy  also  favoured  relatively  low  social  welfare  payments. 
Perception of cheating negatively impacted on all three categories of payments, while 
those who favoured a competitive as opposed to egalitarian ideology favoured lower 
unemployment and child benefit, but not old age pension, payments. Indeed, when the 
attitudinal controls are removed, the most noticeable effect is that the age coefficient 
on preferences for pensions becomes significantly positive. Surprisingly, at least to 
the authors, the provision of macro level data with respect to the cost of all of the 
major  categories  of  social  welfare  payments  had  no  discernable  effect  on  the 
respondents’  views  of  the  appropriate  levels  of  any  of  the  three  social  welfare 
payments. 
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V - CONCLUSIONS 
 
The recent literature on preferences for distribution and redistribution has operated 
on  too  general  a  level.  This  paper  has  attempted  to  move  the  literature  in  the 
appropriate  direction by examining the demand for three  important categories of 
social  welfare  expenditures  in  Ireland.  It  is  noteworthy  that  the  determinants  of 
preferences for the different social welfare schemes diverge in ways that could be 
predicted fairly well by the self-interested economics perspective.   GEARY WP/8/2006 
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Table 1: Respondents’ Priority for Extra Social Welfare Spending 
  Frequency  Percent 
Pensions  350  30.2 
Benefits for Disabled People  309  26.7 
None of These  167  14.4 
Child Benefit  136  11.7 
Benefit for Unemployed People  93  8.0 
Benefits for Single Parents  70  6.0 
Missing   34  2.9 
Total  1,159   
 
Table 2: SUR Determinants of Preferences for Level of Benefit Payment 






  B  SE  B  SE  B  SE 
Dependent Children  0.27***  0.11  0.47***  0.11  0.31***  0.11 
Household Size  -0.10***  0.03  -0.02  0.03  -0.02  0.03 
Male  0.19***  0.09  0.02  0.09  0.05  0.09 
Married  0.02  0.11  0.10  0.10  -0.14  0.10 
Age  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02 
Age Squared  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Full-time Employed  -0.21***  0.10  -0.05  0.10  0.07  0.10 
Education             
Primary             
Secondary  0.01  0.14  -0.01  0.13  -0.15  0.14 
Some College  -0.23  0.18  -0.15  0.17  -0.15  0.17 
Degree  0.26  0.24  0.42**  0.23  0.20  0.24 
Income             
< €30,000             
€30,000 - €60,000  -0.19*  0.10  -0.29**  0.10  0.16  0.10 
> €60,000  -0.33**  0.15  -0.20  0.14  0.18  0.14 
Government Spending             
More  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Same  -0.06  0.11  -0.08  0.11  0.15  0.11 
Less  -0.29***  0.11  -0.40***  0.11  -0.36***  0.11 
Competitive Ideology  -0.10***  0.02  -0.08***  0.02  0.00  0.02 
Perception of Welfare Cheating  -0.19***  0.02  -0.10***  0.02  -0.10***  0.02 
In Favour of Low Taxes  -0.06***  0.02  0.01  0.02  -0.03  0.02 
Version   .08  0.08  0.03  0.07  0.08  0.07 
_cons  6.46  0.40  5.68  0.38  5.42  0.39 
 
Equation  Obs  Parms  RMSE  "R-sq"  chi2  P 
Ue  764  14  1.209968  0.1358  120.03  0 
Cb  764  14  1.08246  0.127  111.19  0 
Oap  764  14  1.10454  0.0942  79.44  0 
***: Statistically significant at 1% level; **: Statistically significant at 5% level; *: 
Statistically significant at 10% level.   GEARY WP/8/2006 
                                                                                                                                            
i Coughlan (1966), as cited in Curry (2003), in reviewing the development of social service provision 
provides a quote that is illustrative: “Most people are aware of the ad hoc and fragmentary way in 
which  the  social  services  came  into  being;  they  were  largely  a  piecemeal  growth,  introduced  at 
different times to cover different categories of need and in response to different pressures, the result of 
a wide variety of motives – humanitarianism, social idealism, political expediency, the desire to damp 
down social discontent, the response to the spread of democracy and universal suffrage, the need to 
provide an environment conducive to industrial development. Seldom were they the expression of a 
coherent philosophical outlook”. 
ii See the Department of Social and Family Affairs’ website (http://www.welfare.ie/) for more details. 
iii The State old age pension system is operated on a pay as you go system. An important aspect of the 
system is the sustainability of higher levels of pensions in the face of an ageing population. While 
Ireland’s demographic pyramid is more robust than many other European countries (e.g. France or 
Germany), it is still the case that the country faces an increasing pension bill. De Vaus, Gray and 
Stanton (2003) review some of the potential consequences of increasingly ageing populations, among 
them  increasing  age  polarisation  and  age  group  consciousness  and  conflict  between  generations 
undermining social cohesion. Fahey, Fitzgerald and Maitre (1997) in an Irish context argue that the 
increased pension bill going forward will be offset by favourable employment trends. 